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  Jason	  Brownlee	  	  Many	   scholars	   of	   democratization	   posit	   that	   increased	   linkage	   between	   a	  hybrid	   regime	   and	   the	  West	   will	   lead	   to	   increased	   democratization.	   	   In	   Morocco	  during	   the	   past	   decade,	   however,	   authoritarianism	   continued	   to	   flourish	   despite	  increased	   linkage	  with	   both	   the	   United	   States	   and	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   This	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   contradiction,	   arguing	   that	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   linkage	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   environment	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INTRODUCTION	  	  During	  the	  1990s,	  Morocco	  experienced	  an	  unprecedented	  period	  of	  liberal	  reform.	  	  After	  nearly	  thirty	  years	  of	  political	  oppression	  and	  authoritarian	  monarchical	  rule	  under	  King	  Hassan	  II,	  these	  reforms	  came	  as	  a	  welcome	  surprise.	  	  The	  long	  repressed	  political	  opposition,	  particularly	  leftist	  parties,	  gained	  access	  to	  political	  participation	  while	  journalists	  and	  human	  rights	  activists	  enjoyed	  a	  respite	  from	  the	  state’s	  security	  apparatus.	  	  It	  seems	  as	  though	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Bullet	  Years”	  had	  come	  to	  an	  end	  and	  when	  Hassan	  II	  passed	  away	  unexpectedly	  in	  1999	  many	  observers,	  both	  foreign	  and	  domestic,	  anticipated	  continued	  political	  reform	  and	  liberal	  change	  under	  the	  new	  king,	  Mohammad	  VI.	  	  Yet,	  during	  the	  decade	  or	  so	  since	  the	  death	  of	  Hassan	  II,	  Morocco	  failed	  to	  witness	  any	  period	  of	  reform	  rivaling	  that	  of	  the	  1990s.	  	  	  In	  fact,	  during	  the	  period	  between	  1999-­‐2011	  Morocco	  experienced	  a	  period	  marked	  by	  political	  deliberalization,	  democratic	  backsliding,	  and	  a	  weakened	  commitment	  to	  reform	  in	  general.	  	  	  Surprisingly,	  during	  this	  same	  period	  linkage	  between	  Morocco	  and	  developed	  countries	  in	  the	  West	  increased	  significantly.	  	  This	  marked	  regression	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  liberal	  democratic	  reform	  in	  spite	  of	  increased	  linkage	  directly	  contradicts	  a	  number	  of	  theories	  concerning	  the	  role	  of	  external	  actors	  in	  the	  process	  of	  democratization.	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  address	  this	  contradiction,	  arguing	  that	  increased	  linkage,	  particularly	  in	  the	  form	  of	  economic	  and	  intergovernmental	  ties,	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between	  Morocco	  and	  the	  West	  fostered	  an	  environment	  favorable	  to	  increased	  authoritarian	  rule	  and	  a	  subsequent	  shift	  away	  from	  liberal	  reform.	  	  
METHODOLOGY	  While	  a	  number	  of	  theories	  exist	  to	  address	  the	  impact	  of	  linkage	  on	  democratization,	  this	  study	  will	  focus	  specifically	  on	  the	  theory	  put	  forth	  by	  Steven	  Levitsky	  and	  Lucan	  A.	  	  Way	  in	  Competitive	  Authoritarianism:	  Hybrid	  Regimes	  in	  Post-­‐
Soviet	  States.1	  In	  Competitive	  Authoritarianism,	  the	  authors	  posit	  that	  democratization	  within	  hybrid	  authoritarian	  regimes	  depends	  largely	  on	  international	  interests.	  	  	  They	  contend	  that	  “linkage,”	  or	  the	  extent	  ties	  between	  governments,	  and	  “leverage,”	  the	  capacity	  of	  a	  one	  regime	  to	  exert	  influence	  over	  another,	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  democratic	  trajectory	  of	  a	  given	  country.	  	  	  In	  countries	  where	  linkage	  and	  leverage	  are	  high,	  a	  hybrid	  regime	  will	  face	  external	  pressure	  to	  democratize	  and	  democratization	  may	  begin.	  	  	  In	  states	  where	  linkage	  and	  leverage	  remain	  low,	  authoritarian	  practices	  will	  most	  likely	  continue.	  	  Table	  1	  shows	  the	  possible	  outcomes	  of	  variation	  in	  linkage	  and	  leverage.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Levitsky	  and	  Way,	  Competitive	  Authoritarianism:	  Hybrid	  Regimes	  in	  Post-­‐Soviet	  States.	  	  Steven	  Levitsky	  Soviet	  States	  is	  a	  Professor	  of	  Government	  at	  Harvard	  University.	  	  Lucan	  A.	  	  Way	  is	  an	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   High	  Linkage	   Low	  Linkage	  
High	  Leverage	   Consistent	  and	  effective	  democratizing	  pressure	   Intermittent	  and	  limited	  democratizing	  pressure	  
Low	  Leverage	   Consistent	  but	  diffuse,	  indirect	  democratization	   Weak	  external	  democratizing	  pressure	  
Table	  1:	   How	  Variation	  in	  Linkage	  and	  Leverage	  Shape	  External	  Pressure	  for	  Democratization.2	  	  	   Levitsky	  and	  Way’s	  theory	  of	  linkage	  and	  leverage	  serves	  as	  a	  useful	  starting	  point	  in	  determining	  hybrid	  regimes	  propensity	  to	  democratize.	  	  	  However,	  this	  paper	  will	  expand	  upon	  their	  theory	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  explain	  the	  variance	  in	  behavior	  exhibited	  by	  the	  regime	  of	  Mohammad	  VI	  in	  Morocco,	  where	  external	  pressure	  to	  democratize	  and	  internal	  attempts	  at	  democratization	  exhibited	  an	  inverse	  trend	  when	  compared	  with	  linkage.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  Morocco’s	  willingness	  to	  support	  Western	  regional	  interests,	  in	  particular	  the	  War	  on	  Terror	  and	  the	  Peace	  Process,	  afforded	  the	  kingdom	  a	  unique	  type	  of	  leverage	  of	  its	  own.	  	  By	  creating	  for	  itself	  a	  sort	  of	  diplomatic	  niche,	  Morocco	  ensured	  that	  it	  would	  face	  little	  pressure	  from	  outside	  to	  initiate	  liberal	  or	  democratic	  political	  reform.	  	  In	  return	  for	  cooperation,	  Morocco	  increased	  its	  linkage	  with	  the	  West.	  	  Facing	  little	  internal	  or	  external	  pressure	  to	  democratize	  and	  capitalizing	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  increased	  linkage,	  the	  Mohammad	  VI	  regime	  pursued	  a	  policy	  of	  liberalization	  in	  areas	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Levitsky	  and	  Way,	  Linkage	  versus	  Leverage.	  	  Rethinking	  the	  International	  Dimension	  of	  Regime	  
Change,	  388.	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posed	  little	  threat	  to	  their	  monopoly	  on	  power,	  while	  simultaneously	  limiting	  reform	  or	  even	  deliberalizing	  in	  other	  areas.	  	  In	  short,	  increased	  linkage	  provided	  the	  monarchy	  with	  the	  tools	  necessary	  to	  leverage	  its	  own	  citizens	  and	  revert	  to	  its	  previous	  authoritarian	  practices.	  	  	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  provide	  a	  useful	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  understanding	  the	  nature	  of	  relationships	  between	  the	  West	  and	  hybrid	  regimes	  like	  Morocco.	  	  However,	  their	  theory	  suffers	  from	  a	  number	  of	  shortcomings.	  	  When	  addressed,	  these	  shortcomings	  help	  to	  account	  for	  difference	  in	  both	  their	  anticipated	  results	  and	  developmental	  realities	  in	  the	  Moroccan	  case.	  	  This	  study	  will	  seek	  to	  comment	  and	  expand	  upon	  the	  Levitsky	  and	  Way’s	  theory	  of	  linkage	  and	  leverage	  in	  order	  to	  address	  such	  unmet	  expectations.	  	  In	  particular,	  I	  contend	  that	  the	  limited	  definition	  of	  linkage	  proffered	  in	  Competitive	  Authoritarianism	  requires	  further	  analysis,	  especially	  in	  regard	  its	  component	  parts.	  	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  calculate	  linkage	  utilizing	  four	  variables:	  	  1. Economic	  Ties:	  Measured	  by	  the	  extent	  of	  trade	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  15	  EU	  member	  countries	  (exports	  and	  imports	  over	  GDP)	  (log)	  (1990-­‐2000),	  excluding	  years	  when	  a	  country	  is	  democratic.	  	  	  2. Social	  Ties:	  Measured	  by	  the	  average	  annual	  number	  of	  a	  country’s	  citizen’s	  traveling	  to	  or	  living	  in	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  (1990-­‐2000)	  as	  a	  share	  of	  total	  country	  population	  (log),	  excluding	  years	  when	  a	  country	  is	  democratic.	  3. Communication	  Ties:	  Measured	  by	  per	  capita	  average	  annual	  international	  voice	  traffic	  (1993-­‐2000)	  and	  per	  capita	  average	  annual	  internet	  access	  (1995-­‐2000),	  excluding	  years	  when	  a	  country	  is	  democratic.	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4. Intergovernmental	  Ties:	  Measured	  by	  membership	  in	  the	  Organization	  of	  American	  States	  (OAS)	  or	  potential	  membership	  in	  the	  EU.	  	  3	  	  	  Each	  of	  these	  factors	  suffers	  from	  a	  problem	  of	  scope	  that,	  in	  turn,	  limits	  their	  effectiveness	  as	  indicators	  of	  linkage.	  	  A	  focus	  on	  economic	  and	  intergovernmental	  ties,	  though	  logical,	  overlooks	  other	  equally	  significant	  non-­‐trade	  ties.	  	  Furthermore,	  assessing	  intergovernmental	  ties,	  in	  terms	  of	  EU	  and	  OAS	  membership	  privileges	  the	  geographic	  neighbors	  of	  the	  west	  and	  ignores	  other	  significant	  intergovernmental	  ties	  with	  states	  ineligible	  for	  membership	  in	  these	  organizations.	  	  Furthermore,	  Levitsky	  and	  Way’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  social	  ties	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  size	  of	  expatriate	  communities	  in	  the	  West	  fails	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  existence	  of	  small	  communities	  that	  might	  proves	  significantly	  influential.	  	  Finally,	  the	  decision	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  authors	  to	  utilize	  social	  and	  communication	  ties	  as	  primary	  indicators	  of	  linkage	  goes	  largely	  unjustified	  and	  unexplained,	  and	  accordingly	  I	  will	  exclude	  it	  from	  the	  following	  study.	  	  Yet,	  even	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  their	  study,	  utilization	  of	  Levitsky	  and	  Way’s	  method	  of	  calculating	  linkage	  shows	  Morocco’s	  linkage	  with	  the	  West	  increased	  over	  time	  across	  all	  four	  categories.	  	  	  However,	  given	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  indicators	  presented	  by	  Levitsky	  and	  Way,	  particularly	  in	  regards	  to	  social	  and	  communication	  ties,	  this	  paper	  will	  focus	  and	  expand	  exclusively	  on	  economic	  and	  intergovernmental	  ties	  between	  Morocco	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Levitsky	  and	  Way,	  Competitive	  Authoritarianism,	  374.	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and	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  as	  determinants	  of	  linkage.	  	  The	  decision	  to	  give	  primacy	  to	  these	  factors	  reflects	  an	  adherence	  to	  a	  more	  traditional	  definition	  of	  linkage,	  as	  these	  two	  factors	  ultimately	  prove	  more	  important	  and	  convincing	  when	  determining	  the	  likelihood	  of	  external	  pressure	  to	  democratize.	  	  Accordingly,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  other	  factors	  influencing	  economic	  and	  intergovernmental	  ties,	  including	  free	  trade	  agreements,	  foreign	  direct	  investment,	  and	  foreign	  aid.	  	  I	  will	  then	  assess	  intergovernmental	  ties	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  EU	  Neighborhood	  Plan,	  NATO	  Major	  Non-­‐member	  Ally	  Status,	  and	  the	  Morocco	  Millennium	  Challenge	  Compact.	  Another	  point	  needing	  further	  evaluation	  concerns	  the	  actual	  method	  of	  determining	  linkage.	  	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  determine	  linkage	  through	  relative	  statistical	  analysis,	  choosing	  to	  rank	  each	  of	  the	  world’s	  “non-­‐democratic”	  countries	  in	  quintiles	  “based	  on	  [their]	  ranking	  relative	  to	  all	  non-­‐Western	  countries	  in	  the	  world	  (5=highest	  quintile;	  1=lowest	  quintile).	  	  The	  scores	  on	  the	  four	  dimensions	  are	  summed	  into	  a	  total	  score,	  which	  was	  recalculated	  so	  that	  scores	  range	  from	  0	  to	  1.”4	  Unfortunately,	  the	  results	  of	  such	  an	  analysis	  cannot,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  time	  being,	  be	  replicated.5	  Accordingly,	  I	  will	  not	  attempt	  to	  rank	  Moroccan	  linkage	  relative	  to	  all	  other	  non-­‐Western,	  non-­‐democratic	  countries.	  	  Instead,	  I	  will	  compare	  Moroccan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Levitsky	  and	  Way,	  Competitive	  Authoritarianism,	  374.	  5	  Levistsky	  and	  Way	  provide	  their	  computational	  formula	  in	  the	  index	  of	  Competitive	  Authoritariansim.	  	  Given	  the	  convoluted	  explanation	  provided,	  however,	  I	  could	  not	  replicate	  their	  results.	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linkage	  over	  two	  periods	  (1990-­‐1999	  and	  1999-­‐2011),	  arguing	  that	  linkage	  increased	  from	  one	  period	  to	  another.	  	  While	  this	  method	  does	  not	  specifically	  align	  with	  the	  methodology	  outlined	  by	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  in	  their	  study,	  it	  provides	  useful	  insight	  into	  whether	  linkage	  and	  leverage	  in	  Morocco	  increased	  or	  decreased	  over	  time	  and	  how	  such	  fluctuations	  impacted	  internal	  and	  external	  pressure	  for	  democratization.	  	  	  	  
WHY	  MOROCCO	  Very	  little	  differentiated	  the	  Moroccan	  monarchy	  from	  its	  authoritarian	  counterparts	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  (MENA)	  region	  during	  the	  period	  beginning	  in	  1999	  and	  ending	  in	  early	  2011.6	  	  Though	  often	  considered	  comparatively	  less	  repressive	  than	  other	  hybrid	  regimes	  in	  the	  region,	  the	  Mohammad	  VI	  regime	  exhibited	  many	  of	  the	  same	  behaviors	  as	  the	  Mubarak	  regime	  in	  Egypt,	  the	  Assad	  regime	  in	  Syria,	  and	  the	  Bin	  Ali	  regime	  in	  Tunisia.7	  	  The	  political	  opposition	  faced	  repression	  and	  persecution,	  the	  regime	  violated	  basic	  human	  rights,	  and	  clientelism	  ran	  rampant	  in	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  government.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  Human	  Development	  Indicators,	  the	  trajectory	  of	  Morocco	  closely	  mirrored	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  In	  early	  2011	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  began	  to	  sweep	  through	  the	  Arab	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa.	  	  Following	  its	  arrival	  in	  Morocco,	  the	  regime	  undertook	  political	  reform	  to	  avoid	  political	  disorder	  and	  social	  unrest.	  	  Thus,	  this	  paper	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  years	  preceding	  this	  shift	  in	  policy.	  	  	  7	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  exclude	  Morocco	  from	  their	  study	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  external	  pressure	  on	  democratization	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  most	  important	  official	  is	  not	  elected.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  exclusion	  is	  inappropriate,	  as	  Moroccan	  parliamentary	  and	  local	  politics	  are	  incredibly	  free,	  fair,	  and	  productive.	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regional	  trends	  during	  the	  past	  decade.8	  	  Although	  underperformed	  Egypt,	  Tunisia,	  and	  Arab	  states,	  Morocco	  also	  witnessed	  steady	  improvements	  in	  per	  capita	  income,	  health,	  and	  education.9	  	  While	  the	  past	  decade	  of	  Moroccan	  politics	  differed	  little	  from	  region-­‐wide	  trends,	  it	  did	  differ	  from	  Moroccan	  politics	  during	  the	  1990s	  when	  King	  Hassan	  II	  made	  serious	  attempts	  at	  liberalizing	  Moroccan	  society	  and	  politics.	  	  Though	  not	  all	  encompassing,	  the	  reforms	  enacted	  by	  Hassan	  II	  marked	  an	  important	  shift	  away	  from	  authoritarian	  politics	  and	  toward	  a	  more	  inclusive,	  pluralistic	  regime.	  	  This	  move	  towards	  increased	  participation	  and	  pluralism	  began	  to	  wane	  when	  Hassan	  II’s	  heir,	  Mohammad	  VI,	  came	  to	  power	  in	  1999.	  	  Such	  a	  regression	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  greater	  linkage	  contradicts	  the	  theory	  put	  forth	  by	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  and	  Morocco’s	  exceptionalism	  in	  this	  regard	  warrants	  further	  attention	  and	  examination.	  	  	  I	  should	  note	  here	  that	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  exclude	  Morocco	  from	  their	  study,	  arguing	  that	  it	  does	  not	  fit	  their	  definition	  of	  a	  hybrid	  regime	  because	  “the	  most	  important	  executive	  office	  is	  not	  elected.”10	  	  This	  exclusion	  of	  Morocco	  deserves	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  UNDP	  Country	  Profile:	  Morocco	  9	  UNDP	  Country	  Explanations:	  Morocco	  10	  Levitsky	  and	  Way,	  Competitive	  Authoritarianism,	  32.	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  also	  exclude	  from	  their	  study	  regimes	  in	  which	  “the	  top	  executive	  positions	  are	  filled	  via	  elections	  but	  the	  authority	  of	  elected	  governments	  is	  seriously	  strained	  by	  the	  military	  or	  other	  nonelected	  bodies,”	  as	  well	  as	  “competitive	  regimes	  under	  foreign	  occupation.”	  This	  presents	  a	  serious	  problem	  insofar	  as	  the	  authors	  eliminate	  nearly	  all	  regimes	  in	  the	  MENA	  region,	  including	  non-­‐monarchies	  like	  Egypt	  and	  Syria.	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further	  review	  and	  consideration	  as,	  parliamentary	  and	  local	  elections	  and	  the	  institutional	  battles	  that	  they	  alleviate	  or	  exacerbate	  are	  important	  in	  the	  Moroccan	  context.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  Moroccan	  electoral	  sphere	  during	  the	  period	  taken	  under	  study	  by	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  witnessed	  important	  increases	  in	  political	  participation.	  	  However	  exceptional	  Morocco	  may	  appear	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  regimes	  studied	  by	  Levitsky	  and	  Way,	  it	  still	  provides	  an	  electoral	  arena	  in	  which	  we	  can	  trace	  whether	  politics	  are	  becoming	  more	  or	  less	  competitive.	  	  Since	  Levitsky	  and	  way	  provide	  no	  reason	  why	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  of	  their	  theory	  would	  not	  apply	  in	  other	  electoral	  contexts,	  we	  may	  apply	  their	  theory	  of	  linkage	  and	  leverage	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Morocco	  during	  both	  the	  decade	  preceding	  and	  following	  the	  new	  millennium.	  	  	  
LINKAGE	  AND	  LEVERAGE	  UNDER	  HASSAN	  II	  From	  the	  1970s	  to	  the	  early	  1990s,	  political	  liberalization	  in	  Morocco	  remained	  virtually	  nonexistent.	  	  King	  Hassan	  II	  actively	  and	  brutally	  persecuted	  his	  political	  opposition	  and	  effectively	  limited	  the	  growth	  of	  Moroccan	  civil	  society.	  	  In	  the	  first	  few	  years	  of	  his	  reign,	  Hassan	  II	  made	  piecemeal	  attempts	  at	  political	  reform,	  but	  this	  period	  of	  liberalization	  came	  to	  a	  quick	  close	  after	  two	  failed	  coup	  attempts	  in	  1971	  and	  1972.	  	  The	  ensuing	  crackdown	  came	  swiftly	  and	  decisively.	  	  A	  MERIP	  report	  published	  in	  1977	  described	  the	  situation,	  stating:	  For	  all	  the	  talk	  of	  constitutionalism,	  Morocco	  remains	  an	  absolute	  monarchy	  where	  legal	  opposition	  politics	  are	  permitted	  only	  the	  most	  tenuous	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existence.	  	  The	  regime	  has	  sought	  to	  suppress	  every	  form	  of	  organized	  political	  life	  .	  	  .	  	  .	  	  In	  the	  past	  eight	  months	  alone,	  there	  have	  been	  nine	  political	  trials,	  affecting	  more	  than	  three	  hundred	  political	  prisoners.	  	  .	  	  .	  	  Informed	  sources	  estimate	  that	  Moroccan	  jails	  now	  contain	  hundreds	  of	  political	  prisoners	  still	  awaiting	  trials	  as	  well	  as	  thousands	  of	  others	  detained	  for	  political	  reasons.11	  	  By	  the	  early-­‐1990s,	  the	  dire	  socio-­‐political	  conditions	  in	  Morocco	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  groups.	  	  In	  1991,	  Amnesty	  International	  issued	  a	  report,	  claiming	  that	  The	  Moroccan	  authorities	  have	  for	  decades	  routinely	  practised	  a	  system	  of	  
garde	  à	  vue	  detention	  where	  a	  detainee	  can	  be	  completely	  cut	  off	  from	  the	  outside	  world.	  	  	  This	  system	  of	  indefinite	  incommunicado	  detention	  disregards	  the	  most	  basic	  safeguards	  for	  detainees	  against	  torture	  and	  denies	  them	  the	  chance	  to	  consult	  their	  lawyers,	  see	  their	  families	  or	  challenge	  the	  legality	  of	  their	  detention	  before	  an	  independent	  judicial	  authority.12	  	  Such	  conditions,	  neither	  new	  nor	  unique	  in	  the	  MENA	  region,	  signaled	  a	  fundamental	  lack	  of	  change	  within	  the	  kingdom	  during	  a	  period	  of	  more	  than	  two	  decades.	  	  This	  type	  of	  treatment	  and	  governance	  characterized	  the	  rule	  of	  Hassan	  II,	  causing	  the	  liberal	  reforms	  that	  came	  in	  the	  final	  years	  of	  his	  reign	  to	  take	  many	  by	  surprise.	  	  	  In	  1992	  and	  again	  in	  1996	  King	  Hassan	  II	  called	  for	  the	  amendment	  of	  the	  country’s	  constitution.	  	  While	  the	  monarchy	  retained	  an	  inordinate	  of	  power,	  Hassan	  II	  moved	  to	  increase	  the	  legislative	  power	  of	  parliament.	  	  The	  power	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Paul,	  Wave	  of	  Repression	  Sweeps	  Morocco.	  	  	  	  12	  Amnesty	  International.	  	  Morocco:	  A	  Pattern	  of	  Political	  Imprisonment,	  
‘Disappearances,’	  and	  Torture,	  5.	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select	  the	  country’s	  Prime	  Minister	  still	  lay	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  king,	  but	  the	  new	  constitution	  forced	  him	  to	  choose	  from	  his	  appointee	  from	  the	  majority	  party.	  	  The	  reforms	  also	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  “Constitutional	  Council,”	  possessing	  the	  power	  of	  legislative	  oversight.	  	  Additionally,	  King	  Hassan	  II	  sought	  greater	  political	  pluralism	  within	  the	  Moroccan	  political	  system,	  allowing	  for	  the	  participation	  of	  previously	  illegal	  Islamist	  parties	  in	  electoral	  politics.	  	  Again,	  the	  king	  retained	  an	  inordinate	  amount	  of	  power,	  but	  from	  a	  regional	  comparative	  perspective	  no	  other	  regime	  could	  rival	  or	  even	  parallel	  this	  shift	  in	  policy.	  In	  1997	  this	  political	  opening	  and	  period	  of	  reform	  led	  to	  the	  victory	  of	  an	  opposition	  party,	  the	  Socialist	  Union	  of	  Popular	  Forces,	  in	  Morocco’s	  parliamentary	  elections.	  	  This	  opposition	  victory	  and	  the	  successive	  period	  of	  parliamentary	  leadership,	  known	  as	  the	  alternance,	  marked	  an	  important	  moment	  not	  only	  for	  Morocco	  but	  also	  for	  the	  region	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  The	  victory	  of	  the	  Socialist	  Union	  of	  Popular	  Forces	  marked	  the	  first	  time	  that	  an	  opposition	  party	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  achieved	  an	  electoral	  victory	  in	  parliamentary	  elections.13	  	  Though	  not	  indicative	  of	  full	  democratization	  of	  the	  Moroccan	  political	  system,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  opposition	  at	  the	  polls	  in	  this	  election	  indicated	  a	  clear	  shift	  in	  the	  regime’s	  toleration	  of	  the	  opposition	  and	  a	  willingness	  to	  consider	  a	  political	  opening.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Cohen	  and	  Jaidi,	  Morocco:	  Globalization	  and	  its	  Consequences,	  58.	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The	  impetus	  for	  internal	  democratization	  in	  the	  1990s	  remained	  minimal.	  	  Hassan	  II’s	  control	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  remained	  intact	  and	  the	  country	  witnessed	  no	  discernable	  spike	  in	  public	  mobilization	  in	  opposition	  to	  his	  repressive	  policies.	  	  The	  opposition	  mounted	  challenges	  to	  the	  regime’s	  repressive	  conduct,	  but	  none	  that	  seriously	  threatened	  the	  regime’s	  durability.14	  	  Though	  we	  cannot	  definitively	  know	  for	  sure	  what	  spurred	  Hassan	  II’s	  move	  towards	  social	  and	  political	  liberalization,	  in	  the	  next	  few	  pages	  I	  offer	  two	  possible	  explanations	  for	  this	  dramatic	  change	  in	  policy.	  	  The	  first	  possibility	  relates	  to	  Hassan	  II’s	  age	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  succession,	  and	  the	  second	  reflects	  a	  concern	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  monarchy	  over	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  Third	  Wave-­‐style	  political	  revolution	  in	  Morocco.15	  	  In	  terms	  of	  succession,	  liberalization	  of	  political	  and	  social	  life	  in	  Morocco	  makes	  sense,	  as	  moments	  of	  leadership	  change	  can	  often	  create	  an	  opening	  for	  dissent.	  	  When	  a	  regime,	  especially	  an	  authoritarian	  one,	  experiences	  a	  period	  of	  leadership	  transition	  opponents	  of	  the	  regime	  may	  perceive	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  reform	  and	  change.	  	  We	  can	  therefore	  infer	  that	  Hassan	  II	  wanted	  to	  minimize	  the	  likelihood	  of	  this	  outcome	  in	  the	  event	  of	  his	  death,	  and	  began	  to	  implement	  gradual	  reform	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  circumventing	  such	  a	  situation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  threatening	  movement	  during	  this	  period	  was	  the	  POLISARIO	  Movement,	  which	  battled	  with	  Morocco,	  Algeria,	  and	  Mauritania	  for	  control	  and	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  Western	  Sahara.	  15	  The	  term	  Third	  Wave	  and	  its	  accompanying	  theory	  of	  democratization	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  Samuel	  Huntington.	  	  Huntington	  introduced	  the	  term	  in	  his	  1991	  article,	  The	  Third	  Wave,	  and	  expanded	  on	  this	  theory	  in	  his	  subsequent	  book	  The	  Third	  Wave:	  Democratization	  in	  the	  Late	  Twentieth	  Century.	  	  Beginning	  in	  Portugal	  in	  1974,	  the	  Third	  Wave	  represented	  a	  global	  resurgence	  of	  democracy	  unparalleled	  since	  the	  period	  between	  WWII	  and	  the	  early	  1960s.	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The	  second	  explanation,	  concern	  over	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  political	  revolution,	  proves	  likely	  as	  well.	  	  Beginning	  in	  the	  1970s	  authoritarian	  countries	  in	  various	  regions	  of	  the	  world	  fell	  victim	  to	  the	  democratic	  aspirations	  of	  their	  citizens.	  	  Though	  this	  so-­‐called	  Third	  Wave	  of	  democratization	  bypassed	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  regional	  autocrats	  concerned	  themselves	  with	  preventing	  similar	  movements	  within	  their	  own	  countries.	  	  Both	  Algeria	  and	  Mauritania,	  though	  mired	  in	  domestic	  political	  struggles,	  enacted	  moderate	  liberal	  and	  democratic	  reforms	  during	  this	  period	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  quieting	  dissent.	  	  Given	  the	  economic	  crisis	  experienced	  in	  Morocco	  during	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  the	  continued	  struggle	  over	  control	  of	  the	  Western	  Sahara,	  and	  popular	  dissent	  against	  the	  regime	  a	  desire	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  King	  to	  hedge	  his	  bets	  against	  popular	  revolution	  would	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise.	  	  	  Although	  I	  cannot	  definitively	  prove	  these	  theories	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  Moroccan	  archives	  and	  a	  dearth	  of	  online	  media	  archives,	  they	  serve	  to	  explain	  the	  emergence	  of	  liberalization	  more	  effectively	  than	  a	  theory	  focused	  on	  international	  pressure.	  	  US	  support	  of	  political	  liberalization	  in	  Morocco	  during	  the	  1990s	  proves	  unlikely,	  as	  both	  Clinton	  administrations	  relied	  implicitly	  on	  Morocco	  to	  support	  the	  United	  States’	  regional	  interests.	  	  During	  the	  Gulf	  War	  Morocco	  allied	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  Egypt,	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia	  to	  oust	  Saddam	  Hussein	  from	  Kuwait.	  	  Additionally,	  Morocco	  played	  a	  role	  in	  supporting	  the	  United	  States	  in	  brokering	  a	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peace	  treaty	  between	  Arabs	  and	  Israelis	  during	  the	  1993	  Oslo	  Accords.	  	  In	  this	  context,	  political	  reform	  of	  the	  type	  undertaken	  in	  Morocco	  during	  the	  1990s	  contrast	  with	  Western	  interests,	  and	  thus	  the	  likelihood	  that	  liberal	  reforms	  resulted	  from	  the	  application	  of	  international	  leverage	  remains	  improbable.	  	  	  Moreover,	  during	  the	  1990s	  the	  United	  States	  hesitated	  to	  exercise	  leverage	  in	  North	  Africa	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions.	  	  The	  continuing	  conflict	  over	  the	  Western	  Sahara	  and	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Algerian	  Civil	  War	  in	  1991	  bred	  both	  regional	  and	  domestic	  instability.	  	  While	  Morocco	  clashed	  with	  Mauritania	  and	  Algeria	  over	  rights	  to	  the	  mineral-­‐rich	  Western	  Sahara,	  domestic	  tensions	  in	  all	  three	  countries	  came	  to	  a	  head.	  	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  these	  crises,	  the	  United	  States	  quickly	  condemned	  human	  rights	  abuses,	  but	  did	  little	  to	  leverage	  the	  three	  countries	  to	  improve	  their	  human	  rights	  record	  or	  their	  commitment	  to	  democratic	  progress.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Mauritania,	  the	  United	  States	  continued	  its	  support	  of	  the	  country’s	  authoritarian	  Prime	  Minister	  Maaouya	  Ould	  Sid'Ahmed	  Taya	  as	  he	  faced	  and	  violently	  repressed	  internal	  challenges	  to	  his	  authority.	  	  In	  Algeria,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  France	  helped	  to	  engineer	  and	  finance	  a	  military	  coup	  that	  ousted	  the	  country’s	  democratically	  elected	  Islamist	  leader.	  	  Meanwhile,	  in	  Egypt,	  the	  United	  States	  provided	  continued	  endorsement	  of	  the	  Hosni	  Mubarak	  regime,	  even	  though	  his	  repressive	  policies	  directly	  contradicted	  the	  Clinton	  administration’s	  commitment	  to	  spreading	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democracy	  in	  the	  region.16	  	  These	  actions	  clearly	  indicate	  an	  inclination	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  support	  authoritarianism	  over	  democratization	  in	  North	  Africa	  during	  the	  1990s.	  	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  use	  of	  leverage	  on	  Morocco	  to	  democratize	  would	  make	  little	  sense	  and	  would	  contradict	  US	  regional	  objectives.	  	  	  To	  say	  that	  the	  West	  exerted	  no	  leverage	  on	  Morocco	  during	  this	  period	  would	  be	  a	  mistake.	  	  Because	  continued	  abuses	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  Morocco,	  the	  EU	  made	  sparing	  attempts	  to	  encourage	  Hassan	  II	  to	  loosen	  his	  vice	  grip	  on	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  regime’s	  opponents.	  	  In	  fact,	  in	  1992	  the	  European	  Parliament	  (the	  EU’s	  directly	  elected	  representative	  body)	  withheld	  an	  aid	  package	  from	  Morocco	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  encouraging	  human	  rights	  reform	  within	  the	  kingdom.17	  	  Yet,	  in	  spite	  of	  continued	  abuses	  US	  funding	  and	  support	  of	  the	  Hassan	  II	  regime	  fluctuated	  very	  little	  over	  time.	  	  In	  years	  when	  the	  United	  States	  deemed	  Moroccan	  cooperation	  crucial	  to	  the	  furtherance	  of	  US	  regional	  objectives,	  aid	  increased	  in	  spite	  of	  human	  rights	  abuses	  and	  then	  returned	  to	  normal,	  pre-­‐Gulf	  War	  and	  pre-­‐Oslo	  rates.18	  	  
A	  NEW	  KING,	  A	  NEW	  PATH	  Thus,	  the	  final	  decade	  of	  Hassan	  II’s	  rule	  differed	  markedly	  from	  the	  previous	  three	  decades.	  	  Following	  the	  coup	  attempts	  of	  the	  early	  1970s	  the	  Moroccan	  political	  arena	  experienced	  marked	  deliberalization	  and	  political	  or	  civil	  society	  opposition	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Brownlee,	  Democracy	  Prevention,	  61.	  17	  Ottaway	  and	  Riley,	  Morocco:	  From	  Top-­‐down	  Reform	  to	  Democratic	  Transition?.	  18	  U.S.	  	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development	  Economic	  Analysis	  and	  Data	  Services.	  	  “US	  Overseas	  Loans	  &	  Grants:	  Morocco.”	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faced	  incredible	  levels	  of	  repression	  and	  persecution.	  	  By	  the	  1990s	  this	  changed	  and	  Morocco	  witnessed	  attempts,	  albeit	  concentrated,	  at	  political	  liberalization.	  	  Many	  believed	  that	  Hassan’s	  heir,	  Mohammad	  VI,	  would	  carry	  this	  process	  even	  further.	  	  Yet,	  between	  1999	  and	  2010	  the	  new	  king	  did	  little	  to	  further	  open	  the	  country’s	  political	  arena.	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  new	  king	  enacted	  sweeping	  neoliberal	  economic	  reforms,	  believing	  that	  the	  democratizing	  policies	  enacted	  by	  his	  father	  would	  serve	  until	  such	  a	  time	  as	  the	  country	  achieved	  modernization.19	  	  	  
	   In	  an	  attempt	  to	  make	  Morocco	  a	  more	  desirable	  trade	  partner	  and	  appear	  more	  favorable	  to	  Western	  observers	  and	  governments,	  Morocco	  provided	  the	  United	  States	  with	  valuable	  support	  in	  both	  the	  War	  on	  Terror	  and	  the	  Peace	  Process.	  	  Although	  Morocco	  had	  historically	  allied	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe,	  the	  regime’s	  strengthened	  commitment	  to	  US	  and	  EU	  regional	  objective	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  September	  11,	  2001	  terrorist	  attacks	  brought	  unprecedented	  advantages.	  Following	  the	  US	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  in	  2001,	  Morocco	  became	  a	  linchpin	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  regional	  terrorism.	  	  Following	  the	  September	  11	  terrorist	  attacks	  the	  UN	  lauded	  Morocco	  for	  hosting	  an	  international	  conference	  in	  Agadir	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  terrorism	  and	  MENA	  regional	  security.	  	  As	  the	  war	  progressed	  and	  later	  expanded	  into	  Iraq,	  Morocco	  became	  an	  essential	  ally	  in	  detaining	  suspected	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Roula	  Khalaf,	  “Arab	  rulers	  with	  a	  new	  agenda:	  Roula	  Khalaf	  on	  whether	  economic	  modernisation	  can	  proceed	  fast	  enough	  to	  curb	  demands	  for	  political	  reform:”	  Financial	  Times,	  February	  3,	  2000.	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terrorists.	  	  Following	  a	  number	  of	  terrorist	  bombings	  in	  Casablanca	  in	  May	  2003,	  Moroccan	  parliament	  passed	  the	  Law	  to	  Combat	  Terror,	  which	  gave	  Moroccan	  authorities	  a	  veritable	  carte	  blanche	  to	  detain	  dissidents.	  	  This	  law	  immediately	  led	  to	  domestic	  outcry	  and	  criticism,	  with	  Moroccan	  and	  international	  human	  rights	  groups	  arguing	  that	  its	  arbitrary	  definition	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  terrorist	  crime	  allows	  for	  the	  detainment	  and	  torture	  of	  regime	  opponents.20	  	  The	  Moroccan	  government	  has	  also	  collaborated	  with	  US	  intelligence	  agencies	  to	  detain	  and	  torture	  suspected	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  operatives.	  	  Those	  in	  Morocco	  who	  oppose	  these	  practices,	  particularly	  journalists,	  often	  find	  themselves	  on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  this	  arbitrary	  legislation	  and	  frequently	  face	  arrest	  and	  torture.	  	  From	  2001	  to	  2010,	  any	  American	  criticism	  of	  Morocco’s	  anti-­‐democratic	  practices	  may	  have	  endangered	  the	  special	  symbiotic	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  	  The	  US	  stood	  to	  lose	  a	  location	  for	  the	  outsourcing	  of	  terrorist	  detainment	  and	  torture;	  the	  Moroccan	  monarchy	  stood	  to	  lose	  it	  excuse	  to	  eliminate	  its	  own	  opponents.	  	  Instead,	  the	  United	  States	  spent	  more	  money	  on	  ensuring	  the	  durability	  its	  Moroccan	  ally.	  	  In	  2007,	  Morocco	  became	  a	  Millennium	  Challenge	  Corporation	  Compact	  member,	  an	  interesting	  move	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  United	  States	  government	  considering	  membership	  typically	  depends	  on	  a	  domestic	  commitment	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Morocco.	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advancement	  civil	  liberties	  and	  human	  rights.21	  	   In	  addition	  to	  its	  utility	  in	  the	  War	  on	  Terror,	  Morocco	  has	  been	  an	  important	  friend	  to	  the	  United	  States	  in	  dealings	  with	  Israel.	  	  Unlike	  its	  authoritarian	  neighbors,	  Morocco	  sporadically	  engaged	  with	  Israel	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  	  King	  Hassan	  II’s	  consistent	  support	  for	  Israel	  most	  likely	  stemmed	  from	  his	  desire	  to	  suppress	  the	  POLISARIO	  movement	  in	  the	  Western	  Sahara.	  	  Support	  for	  Israel	  during	  the	  tumultuous	  during	  this	  time	  meant	  US	  military	  aid	  to	  the	  kingdom	  to	  in	  order	  to	  help	  win	  the	  fight	  for	  the	  Western	  Sahara.22	  By	  1994,	  this	  courtship	  resulted	  in	  the	  first	  attempts	  at	  an	  official	  diplomatic	  relationship	  and	  Morocco	  became	  one	  of	  Israel’s	  staunchest	  regional	  allies.	  	  Even	  in	  spite	  of	  periods	  of	  tension	  and	  severance	  of	  diplomatic	  relations,	  Morocco	  has	  proven	  more	  willing	  than	  its	  neighbors	  to	  support	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  recent	  strains	  on	  Moroccan-­‐Israeli	  relations	  due	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  Israeli	  settlements	  and	  continued	  attacks	  on	  Gaza,	  the	  United	  States	  still	  looks	  to	  Morocco	  as	  a	  critical	  actor	  in	  brokering	  an	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  peace	  deal.	  	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  Mohammad	  VI	  in	  July	  2009	  President	  Obama	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  As	  a	  Millennium	  Challenge	  recipient,	  Morocco	  received	  $697.5	  billion	  from	  the	  United	  States	  in	  2007	  to	  help	  reduce	  poverty	  and	  aid	  in	  economic	  development.	  	  	  22	  “Obama:	  Morocco	  Can	  Be	  Leader	  in	  Solving	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  Conflict.”	  Arabia	  2000,	  July	  4,	  2009.	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underscored	  this	  hope,	  urging	  the	  monarch	  to	  “be	  a	  leader	  in	  bridging	  gaps	  between	  Israel	  and	  the	  Arab	  world.”23	  	  The	  preceding	  pages	  highlight	  two	  very	  important	  points.	  	  First,	  Morocco	  seemed	  well-­‐positioned	  to	  continue	  along	  a	  democratic	  trajectory	  when	  Mohammad	  VI	  ascended	  to	  the	  throne	  in	  1999.	  	  Second,	  Morocco’s	  continued	  support	  of	  Western	  regional	  objectives	  fortified	  the	  regime	  against	  external	  criticism	  and	  pressure	  to	  democratize.	  	  The	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper	  will	  address	  the	  benefits	  reaped	  by	  Morocco	  because	  of	  their	  support	  of	  Western	  objectives	  and	  explain	  how	  Mohammad	  VI	  used	  those	  benefits	  to	  ensure	  the	  continued	  survival	  of	  his	  regime.	  	  The	  following	  sections	  will	  show	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  increased	  linkage	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  leverage	  permitted	  the	  Mohammad	  VI	  regime	  to	  reform	  in	  some	  areas	  while	  stifling	  reform	  in	  others.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  the	  government	  succeeded	  in	  appeasing	  its	  citizens	  and	  quieting	  its	  critics.	  	  
INCREASING	  LINKAGE	  The	  United	  States’	  reliance	  on	  the	  Mohammad	  VI	  regime	  to	  support	  the	  War	  on	  Terror	  and	  the	  Peace	  Process	  explains	  their	  unwillingness	  to	  leverage	  the	  Moroccan	  regime	  to	  further	  democratize.	  	  Any	  change	  of	  leadership	  in	  the	  upper-­‐echelons	  of	  Moroccan	  government	  could	  threaten	  Morocco’s	  overall	  complicity.	  	  Thus,	  it	  comes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Lee	  Lescaze.	  	  “U.S.	  	  Unveils	  $2.5	  Billion	  Foreign	  Arms	  Aid	  Plan.”	  The	  Washington	  
Post,	  March	  3,	  1977. 
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as	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  Bush	  and	  Obama	  administrations	  committed	  themselves	  to	  continued	  and	  friendly	  relations	  with	  Mohammad	  VI	  despite	  his	  authoritarian	  record.	  	  In	  return	  for	  continued	  Moroccan	  support,	  the	  West	  made	  efforts	  that	  led	  to	  increased	  economic	  and	  intergovernmental	  linkage	  with	  Morocco.	  	  	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  offer	  a	  useful	  framework	  for	  predicting	  the	  likelihood	  of	  democratization	  in	  a	  hybrid	  regime.	  	  However,	  the	  narrow	  scope	  of	  their	  definition	  of	  linkage	  ignores	  other	  pertinent	  economic	  indicators	  that	  serve	  to	  highlight	  the	  extent	  of	  economic	  ties	  between	  countries.	  	  A	  focus	  on	  “the	  extent	  of	  trade	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  15	  EU	  member	  countries”	  renders	  itself	  useful	  as	  a	  starting	  point,	  but	  reliance	  on	  this	  indicator	  alone	  as	  the	  determinant	  of	  the	  level	  of	  economic	  ties	  between	  nations	  proves	  problematic,	  even	  though	  these	  ties	  increased	  for	  Morocco	  during	  both	  periods	  under	  study.	  	  	  Figure	  1	  clearly	  demonstrates	  that	  economic	  ties	  between	  Morocco	  and	  the	  US	  and	  EU,	  as	  defined	  by	  Levitsky	  and	  Way,	  increased	  during	  the	  two	  decades	  under	  study.	  	  Yet,	  this	  does	  little	  to	  reveal	  the	  depth	  of	  these	  ties.	  	  To	  truly	  understand	  the	  increased	  linkage	  between	  Morocco	  and	  the	  West	  we	  should	  direct	  our	  attention	  to	  changes	  in	  other	  factors	  often	  cited	  as	  affecting	  the	  linkage	  between	  countries.	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  Figure	  1:	  	   Extent	  of	  Trade	  with	  the	  US	  and	  EU-­‐15	  Member	  Countries	  for	  Morocco,	  1990-­‐201024	  
ASSOCIATION	  AND	  FREE	  TRADE	  	  Figure	  1	  indicates	  that	  trade	  between	  Morocco	  and	  the	  West	  increased	  steadily	  since	  1990,	  but	  this	  increase	  reveals	  only	  part	  of	  the	  story.25	  	  The	  trade	  relationship	  in	  this	  case	  proves	  more	  deeply	  entrenched	  than	  the	  increase	  shows.	  	  In	  September	  2000,	  Morocco	  signed	  an	  Association	  Agreement	  with	  the	  EU	  building	  upon	  the	  1976	  Cooperation	  Agreement	  between	  the	  two	  parties.	  	  Title	  II	  Article	  Six	  of	  this	  new	  Association	  Agreement	  stipulates	  that	  The	  Community	  and	  Morocco	  shall	  gradually	  establish	  a	  free	  trade	  area	  over	  a	  transitional	  period	  lasting	  a	  maximum	  of	  12	  years	  starting	  from	  the	  date	  of	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  this	  Agreement	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Agreement	  and	  in	  conformity	  with	  those	  of	  the	  1994	  General	  Agreement	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Direction	  of	  Trade	  Statistics:	  Morocco,	  1990-­‐2010.	  	  	  25	  According	  to	  the	  US	  Census,	  US	  annual	  trade	  (imports	  plus	  exports)	  with	  Morocco	  in	  2010	  was	  approximately	  $2,632	  million.	  	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  comparison,	  in	  2010	  annual	  US	  trade	  with	  Israel	  was	  $32,267	  million,	  US	  trade	  with	  Egypt	  was	  $9,073	  million,	  and	  US	  trade	  with	  Jordan	  was	  2,148.	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on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  and	  the	  other	  multilateral	  agreements	  on	  trade	  in	  goods	  annexed	  to	  the	  Agreement	  establishing	  the	  WTO.26	  	  Under	  this	  Agreement,	  the	  Moroccan	  Free	  Trade	  Area	  would	  expire	  in	  2012.	  	  In	  2013,	  the	  EU	  began	  talks	  with	  Morocco	  not	  only	  to	  extend	  the	  Association	  Agreement	  but	  also	  to	  replace	  it	  with	  a	  Deep	  and	  Comprehensive	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement.	  	  This	  proposed	  agreement,	  which	  Morocco	  will	  most	  likely	  accept	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  many	  disadvantages,	  reflects	  the	  consistent	  deepening	  of	  economic	  ties	  between	  Morocco	  and	  the	  EU,	  ties	  that	  quantitative	  data	  alone	  fails	  to	  elucidate.27	  We	  observe	  a	  similar	  deepening	  of	  ties	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Morocco	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	  potential	  for	  a	  US-­‐Moroccan	  free	  trade	  agreement	  emerged	  in	  2003.	  	  The	  resulting	  US-­‐Moroccan	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  went	  into	  effect	  in	  2006,	  replacing	  the	  1985	  Treaty	  Between	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  and	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Morocco	  Concerning	  the	  Encouragement	  and	  Reciprocal	  Protection	  of	  Investments.	  	  The	  stated	  goals	  of	  this	  agreement	  include	  support	  of	  “the	  significant	  economic	  and	  political	  reforms	  that	  are	  underway	  in	  Morocco”	  and	  providing	  “for	  improved	  commercial	  opportunities	  for	  U.S.	  	  exports	  to	  Morocco	  by	  reducing	  and	  eliminating	  trade	  barriers.”28	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  European	  Union,	  “Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  Agreement:	  Morocco.”	  27	  “al-­‐magreb	  usir	  ila	  itifaqiyya	  al-­‐tabadul	  al-­‐hurr	  ma’	  euroba	  raghem	  silbiyyatHa	  ‘ala	  iqtisaad	  al-­‐balad	  mustaqbilan.”	  (Morocco	  insists	  on	  the	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  with	  Europe	  despite	  its	  consequences	  for	  the	  country’s	  economic	  future).	  	  Alif	  Post,	  March	  4,	  2013.	  28Office	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Trade	  Representative.	  	  “US-­‐Morocco	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement.”	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Morocco	  also	  increased	  its	  ties	  with	  the	  West	  in	  other	  ways.	  	  In	  2004,	  Morocco	  earned	  Major	  Non-­‐member	  status	  in	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  and	  in	  2005	  Morocco	  adopted	  the	  European	  Neighborhood	  Policy	  Action	  Plan.	  	  This	  agreement,	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  governmental	  ties	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  kingdom,	  went	  much	  further	  than	  the	  Association	  Agreement	  and	  the	  Agadir	  Agreement	  in	  its	  commitment	  to	  bilateral	  communication	  and	  interaction.	  	  It	  required	  Morocco	  to	  commit	  itself	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  promotion	  of	  democratic	  reform,	  but	  simultaneously	  offered	  Morocco	  the	  opportunity	  to	  participate,	  albeit	  limitedly,	  in	  EU	  policy	  planning	  and	  implementation.	  	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  increased	  linkage	  with	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU	  and	  binding	  intergovernmental	  agreement,	  Morocco	  has	  witnessed	  a	  increase	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  (FDI)	  over	  the	  past	  decade.	  	  Under	  Hassan	  II	  FDI	  accounted	  for	  less	  than	  one	  percent	  of	  Moroccan	  GDP;	  by	  2010	  FDI	  accounted	  for	  nearly	  five	  percent	  of	  GDP.	  	  29	  Although	  it	  represents	  a	  relatively	  small	  portion	  of	  overall	  GDP,	  this	  increase	  between	  1999	  and	  2010	  shows	  that	  free	  trade	  led	  to	  increased	  investment	  in	  Morocco	  and	  thus	  increased	  revenue	  for	  the	  regime	  of	  Mohammad	  VI.	  This	  section	  and	  the	  one	  immediately	  preceding	  it	  reveal	  two	  important	  trends.	  	  First,	  Morocco’s	  commitment	  to	  US	  regional	  strategic	  objectives	  ensured	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  World	  Bank	  Databank,	  Primary	  Income	  on	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment:	  Morocco,	  1990-­‐2010.	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Mohammad	  VI	  regime	  against	  external	  democratizing	  pressure.	  	  Second,	  in	  return	  for	  services	  rendered	  in	  the	  War	  on	  Terror	  and	  the	  Peace	  Process,	  linkage	  between	  Morocco	  and	  the	  West	  increased.	  	  The	  following	  section	  will	  explain	  how	  the	  combination	  of	  these	  trends	  affected	  Moroccan	  domestic	  politics	  and	  allowed	  the	  monarchy	  to	  circumvent	  political	  change.	  	  	  
POLITICS	  AS	  USUAL:	  	  ENSURING	  DOMESTIC	  STABILITY	  AND	  REGIME	  DURABILITY	  Increased	  linkage	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  external	  pressure	  to	  democratize	  created	  a	  situation	  in	  Morocco	  favorable	  to	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  Mohammad	  VI	  regime,	  even	  in	  spite	  of	  liberal	  backsliding.	  	  Between	  1999	  and	  2011,	  Mohammad	  VI	  has	  pursued	  an	  aggressive	  policy	  of	  liberalization	  to	  attract	  foreign	  investment.	  	  In	  return,	  major	  Multinational	  Corporations	  like	  3M,	  Goodyear	  Company,	  and	  Pfizer	  (among	  countless	  others)	  relied	  on	  the	  regime	  to	  provide	  a	  stable	  and	  safe	  environment	  in	  which	  they	  could	  conduct	  business.	  	  The	  domestic	  uncertainty	  and	  unrest	  faced	  by	  the	  Moroccan	  regime	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  as	  a	  result	  of	  poor	  economic	  progress,	  government	  repression,	  and	  lack	  of	  social	  development	  could	  not	  repeat	  itself	  if	  Morocco	  hoped	  to	  capitalize	  on	  its	  increased	  linkage	  with	  the	  west.	  	  	  Although	  Morocco’s	  agreements	  with	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  placed	  emphasis	  on	  the	  need	  for	  domestic	  political	  reform,	  such	  reform	  in	  Morocco	  slowed	  after	  1999	  with	  little	  change	  rivaling	  the	  reforms	  instituted	  by	  Hassan	  II.	  	  Political	  change	  and	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reform	  could	  lead	  to	  uncertainty	  on	  the	  part	  of	  investors	  concerning	  the	  safety	  of	  their	  investments.	  	  Regime	  continuity	  ensures	  the	  longevity	  of	  markets,	  while	  major	  political	  reform	  could	  portent	  potential	  upheaval	  and	  domestic	  conflict.	  Hassan	  II	  faced	  this	  same	  conundrum	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s;	  political	  liberalization	  led	  to	  two	  separate	  attempts	  on	  his	  life	  but	  repression	  led	  to	  increased	  discontent	  and	  criticism	  aimed	  at	  the	  regime.	  	  Mohammad	  IV	  has	  consistently	  proved	  more	  adept	  at	  walking	  the	  fine	  line	  between	  reform	  and	  repression.	  	  From	  1999	  to	  February	  2011,	  the	  monarchy	  made	  little	  effort	  to	  further	  democratize	  the	  political	  process	  in	  Morocco,	  choosing	  instead	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  liberalization	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  Moroccan	  society.	  	  	  The	  2004	  Moudowana	  (Family	  Code)	  best	  represents	  this	  attempt	  at	  social	  reform.	  	  This	  bill	  greatly	  expanded	  the	  rights	  of	  women	  and	  children	  in	  Moroccan	  society.30	  	  In	  terms	  of	  ensuring	  stability,	  this	  move	  reflected	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  concerns	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  regime.	  	  The	  treatment	  of	  women	  in	  Morocco	  has	  long	  been	  a	  concern	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  groups.	  	  A	  1995	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  report	  indicates	  that	  	  Despite	  progress	  in	  certain	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  situation	  in	  Morocco	  during	  the	  past	  few	  years,	  the	  impact	  upon	  women's	  rights	  has	  been	  slight.	  	  The	  activities	  of	  a	  group	  of	  women	  struggling	  for	  equality	  since	  independence	  led	  to	  the	  creation,	  in	  the	  mid	  to	  late	  1980s,	  of	  a	  number	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  dedicated	  to	  protecting	  and	  increasing	  awareness	  of	  women's	  rights.	  	  A	  decade	  later,	  dozens	  of	  women's	  rights	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Human	  Rights	  Education	  Associates.	  	  “The	  Moroccan	  Family	  Code	  (Moudawana)	  of	  February	  5,	  2004.”	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organizations	  are	  active	  in	  these	  efforts.	  	  Morocco	  ratified	  the	  1979	  Convention	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  all	  Forms	  of	  Discrimination	  against	  Women	  in	  June	  1993.	  	  However,	  as	  the	  discussion	  below	  indicates,	  the	  government	  has	  failed	  to	  modify	  domestic	  laws	  in	  conformity	  with	  Morocco's	  obligations	  under	  the	  convention.31	  	  The	  Moudowana	  sought	  to	  address	  these	  issues,	  as	  well	  as	  redress	  the	  inherent	  problems	  of	  its	  predecessor,	  the	  1958	  Moudowana.	  	  While	  the	  updated	  
Moudowana	  received	  criticism	  from	  women’s	  rights	  groups	  and	  leftist	  opposition	  parties	  as	  insufficient,	  it	  nevertheless	  improved	  some	  aspects	  of	  family	  life	  within	  the	  kingdom.	  	  This	  move	  highlights	  the	  regime’s	  ability	  to	  institute	  reform	  that	  stabilizes	  both	  itself	  and	  society.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  updated	  Moudowana	  shows	  that	  the	  government	  takes	  human	  rights	  seriously	  and	  demonstrates	  its	  intention	  to	  liberalize	  the	  country,	  thus	  denying	  the	  opposition	  an	  opportunity	  platform	  from	  which	  to	  challenge	  the	  monarchy.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  Moudowana	  seeks	  to	  limit	  the	  role	  of	  Islam,	  particularly	  the	  more	  conservative	  Salafi	  variety,	  in	  family	  life	  and	  in	  the	  country’s	  legal	  framework.	  	  Secularization	  and	  liberalization	  of	  family	  life	  serves	  to	  undermine	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Islamist	  opposition.	  	  	  At	  the	  macro	  level,	  liberalization	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  increased	  linkage	  with	  the	  West	  has	  proven	  mostly	  beneficial.	  	  As	  previously	  noted,	  primary	  income	  on	  FDI	  in	  Morocco	  increased	  significantly.	  	  Since	  1999,	  similar	  trends	  emerge	  when	  analyzing	  other	  major	  economic	  indicators.	  	  Trade	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  increased	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  “Human	  Rights	  in	  Morocco.”	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from	  55%	  to	  82%	  between	  1999	  and	  2010.32	  	  During	  the	  same	  period,	  national	  GDP	  witnessed	  a	  66%	  increase.	  	  In	  regards	  to	  all	  of	  these	  indicators,	  the	  rate	  of	  increase	  jumped	  dramatically	  following	  the	  US-­‐Moroccan	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement.	  	  	  	  The	  Moroccan	  government	  reinvests	  the	  revenues	  off	  FDI	  and	  increased	  foreign	  aid	  into	  massive	  public	  works	  projects	  aimed	  at	  further	  modernizing	  the	  country	  and	  attracting	  more	  foreign	  investment.	  	  For	  example,	  construction	  of	  a	  new	  state	  of	  the	  art	  port,	  dubbed	  Tangier-­‐Med,	  in	  Tangier	  began	  in	  2003.	  	  This	  project	  aimed	  at	  stimulating	  economic	  progress	  in	  the	  north	  of	  the	  country,	  with	  the	  hope	  of	  increasing	  exports,	  creating	  jobs,	  and	  promoting	  tourism.	  	  In	  a	  country	  where	  unemployment	  remains	  a	  major	  problem	  (see	  Figure	  2),	  the	  government	  deems	  such	  projects	  vital	  to	  stability.	  	  Morocco	  also	  embarked	  on	  the	  Moroccan	  Integrated	  Wind	  Energy	  Project,	  leading	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  nearly	  twenty	  wind	  farms	  since	  2000.	  	  This	  project,	  funded	  by	  the	  Moroccan	  government	  in	  combination	  with	  several	  Gulf	  countries,	  seeks	  to	  provide	  the	  country	  with	  inexpensive	  renewable	  energy	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  attracting	  new	  investment	  to	  the	  developing	  country.	  	  The	  government	  even	  created	  a	  number	  of	  training	  programs	  at	  Moroccan	  schools	  and	  universities	  to	  ensure	  employment	  for	  Moroccan	  citizens.33	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  World	  Bank	  Databank,	  “Trade	  as	  a	  Percentage	  of	  GDP:	  Morocco,”	  1990-­‐2010.	  33	  Kingdom	  of	  Morocco	  -­‐	  Moroccan	  Investment	  Development	  Agency.	  	  “Investment	  Opportunities:	  Wind	  Energy.”	  http://www.invest.gov.ma/?Id=67&lang=en&RefCat=3&Ref=146.	  	  	  
	  	  	   28	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  macro	  development,	  similar	  (though	  admittedly	  less	  rapid)	  changes	  and	  improvements	  also	  occurred	  at	  the	  micro	  level.	  	  When	  he	  came	  to	  power	  in	  1999,	  Mohammad	  VI	  faced	  a	  nation	  gripped	  by	  illiteracy,	  poverty,	  and	  poor	  access	  to	  health	  care.	  	  Progress	  in	  these	  areas	  has	  been	  slow	  and	  has	  hardly	  kept	  apace	  with	  macro	  developments,	  but	  reflects	  honest,	  albeit	  limited,	  efforts	  to	  improve	  the	  standard	  of	  living.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  percentage	  of	  Moroccans	  living	  on	  less	  than	  $2	  per	  day	  decreased	  to	  14%	  in	  only	  eight	  years.34	  	  
	  	  Figure	  2:	   Total	  and	  Youth	  Unemployment	  in	  Morocco,	  1999-­‐200035	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Other	  issues	  like	  the	  quality	  of	  education	  remain	  problematic.	  	  Morocco	  began	  the	  new	  millennium	  with	  an	  adult	  literacy	  rate	  of	  approximately	  50%,	  which	  in	  2002	  prompted	  the	  Moroccan	  government	  to	  commit	  itself	  to	  cutting	  this	  number	  in	  half	  by	  2010.36	  	  One	  year	  before	  this	  deadline,	  adult	  literacy	  rates	  in	  Morocco	  hovered	  around	  56%,	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  the	  ambitious	  desire	  to	  achieve	  75%	  literacy	  in	  merely	  eight	  years.37	  Children’s	  enrollment	  in	  primary	  school	  went	  up	  over	  the	  past	  decade,	  but	  since	  education	  expenditures	  remained	  constant,	  we	  should	  question	  whether	  the	  quality	  of	  education	  kept	  apace.38	  	  Even	  despite	  marginal	  growth	  in	  many	  areas	  of	  society	  the	  regime	  of	  Mohammad	  VI	  has	  consistently	  improved	  the	  lot	  of	  the	  Moroccan	  populace.	  	  All	  boats	  rose,	  though	  perhaps	  unequally.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  regime	  placated	  the	  opposition,	  offering	  social	  improvements	  in	  place	  of	  political	  reform	  and	  minimized	  the	  threat	  of	  any	  serious	  challenge	  to	  the	  regime’s	  longevity.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  it	  created	  a	  relatively	  stable	  environment	  for	  the	  conducting	  of	  international	  business.	  	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  leverage,	  liberal	  social	  and	  economic	  reform	  has	  far	  outpaced	  attempts	  at	  creating	  a	  more	  liberal	  democratic	  political	  environment	  in	  Morocco.	  	  Instead,	  the	  monarchy	  and	  the	  Makhzen,	  the	  monarchical	  elite,	  moved	  to	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  World	  Bank.	  	  “Promoting	  Adult	  Literacy	  in	  Morocco.”	  http://go.worldbank.org/YVBF1T9I50.	  	  Accessed	  April	  23,	  2013.	  37	  World	  Bank	  Databank,	  Literacy	  rate,	  adult	  total	  (%	  of	  people	  ages	  15	  and	  above):	  Morocco,	  1990-­‐2010.	  	  	  38	  World	  Bank	  Databank,	  Public	  spending	  on	  education,	  total	  (%	  of	  government	  expenditure):	  Morocco,	  1990-­‐2010.;	  World	  Bank	  Databank,	  Labor	  force	  with	  primary	  education	  (%	  of	  total):	  Morocco.;	  1990-­‐2010.	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ensure	  their	  own	  survival	  by	  limiting	  political	  participation	  and	  increasing	  the	  costs	  of	  opposing	  or	  criticizing	  the	  regime	  or	  its	  practices.	  	  Mohammad	  VI	  echoed	  this	  commitment	  to	  the	  monarchy’s	  longevity	  in	  his	  speech	  to	  Moroccans	  on	  March	  9,	  2011	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  countrywide	  protests	  and	  demonstrations	  calling	  for	  political	  reform.	  	  In	  this	  speech	  he	  listed	  the	  “imarat	  al-­‐Muminin	  (commandership	  of	  the	  faithful)”	  and	  “the	  monarchy”	  as	  part	  of	  the	  “sacred	  character	  of	  [Moroccans’]	  immutable	  values,	  which	  are	  unanimously	  supported	  by	  the	  nation.”39	  Clearly,	  the	  king	  perceives	  the	  monarchy	  as	  a	  fixed	  institution	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  Moroccan	  politics.	  	  	  This	  inclination	  gets	  reflected	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  domestic	  political	  reform	  within	  Morocco	  since	  the	  death	  of	  Hassan	  II.	  	  Attempts	  at	  creating	  openings	  for	  greater	  political	  pluralism	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  media	  and	  civil	  society	  led	  “to	  the	  adoption	  of	  laws	  that	  are	  broadly	  permissive	  but	  lack	  effective	  safeguards	  against	  arbitrary	  application	  of	  the	  law.”40	  	  This	  creates	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  opposition	  to	  the	  regime	  can	  voice	  their	  dissent,	  and	  in	  which	  the	  government	  can	  eliminate	  potential	  threats	  to	  regime	  stability	  and	  integrity,	  seemingly	  without	  infringing	  on	  human	  or	  civil	  rights.	  	  	  Another	  tactic	  of	  the	  regime	  has	  been	  to	  increase	  the	  power	  of	  parliament	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  “King	  Mohamed	  VI	  Speech	  3/9/11	  (full	  text)	  #Feb20	  #khitab.”	  Moroccans	  for	  Change,	  March	  9,	  2011.	  	  http://moroccansforchange.com/2011/03/09/king-­‐mohamed-­‐vi-­‐speech-­‐3911-­‐full-­‐text-­‐feb20-­‐khitab/.	  	  Accessed	  April	  23,	  2013.	  40	  Kristina	  Kausch,	  Morocco:	  Smart	  Authoritarianism	  Refined.	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and	  its	  elected	  officials	  while	  maintaining	  the	  authority	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  
Makhzen.	  	  This	  group	  consistently	  enjoyed	  power	  and	  privilege	  within	  the	  Moroccan	  regime	  and	  sought	  to	  coopt	  members	  of	  other	  groups	  and	  parties	  who	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  their	  singular	  grip	  on	  power.	  	  They	  control	  the	  purse	  strings	  at	  the	  governmental	  level,	  and	  often	  at	  the	  societal	  level.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  these	  elites	  bankroll	  and	  control	  many	  civil	  society	  actors	  like	  NGOs	  and	  the	  media,	  leading	  to	  the	  furtherance	  of	  their	  own	  interests	  over	  the	  interests	  of	  broader	  society.	  	  Cooptation	  of	  opposition	  party	  notables	  undermines	  their	  legitimacy	  and	  prevents	  interparty	  cooperation	  against	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Makhzen.41	  	  	  
CONCLUSION	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Moroccan	  commitments	  to	  democracy	  regressed	  in	  many	  ways	  during	  the	  period	  from	  1999	  to	  2011	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  decade	  preceding	  it.	  	  During	  the	  1990s,	  Hassan	  II	  attempted	  to	  allow	  for	  political	  openings	  and	  to	  scale	  back	  on	  the	  repressive	  treatment	  of	  journalists	  and	  other	  critics	  of	  the	  regime.	  	  Before	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  the	  reign	  of	  Mohammad	  VI	  witnessed	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  such	  practices,	  focusing	  more	  on	  the	  liberalization	  of	  society	  and	  the	  economy.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  opponents	  of	  the	  regime	  from	  all	  political	  inclinations	  faced	  serious	  consequences	  for	  mounting	  challenges	  to	  the	  power	  of	  the	  palace.	  	  Despite	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  Ellen	  Lust-­‐Okar,	  Divided	  They	  Rule.	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increased	  linkage	  with	  the	  West	  and	  the	  continued	  potential	  of	  the	  west	  to	  leverage	  the	  monarchy,	  Mohammad	  faced	  little	  pressure	  to	  democratize.	  	  In	  international	  terms,	  democratic	  reform	  would	  threaten	  or	  even	  disrupt	  US	  interests	  in	  the	  region.	  	  By	  ensuring	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  Western	  desires,	  Morocco	  leveraged	  itself	  against	  external	  pressure.	  	  In	  domestic	  terms,	  liberal	  social	  and	  economic	  reform	  combined	  with	  relatively	  free	  and	  fair	  elections	  gave	  the	  regime	  a	  modicum	  of	  credit	  with	  the	  opposition.	  	  In	  short,	  instead	  of	  fostering	  the	  growth	  of	  democracy,	  increased	  linkage	  helped	  Mohammad	  VI	  and	  his	  regime	  to	  sow	  the	  seeds	  of	  authoritarianism.	  The	  impact	  and	  implications	  of	  increased	  linkage	  allowed	  the	  Moroccan	  monarchy	  to	  weather	  the	  storm	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  and	  subsequent	  domestic	  uprisings	  quite	  well.	  	  In	  response	  to	  protests	  in	  February	  2011,	  King	  Mohammad	  VI	  delivered	  a	  speech	  to	  the	  country’s	  citizens	  promising	  democratic	  reform.	  	  Making	  little	  direct	  reference	  to	  the	  protest	  movement	  that	  developed	  in	  Morocco,	  the	  king	  committed	  himself	  to	  “giving	  strong	  momentum	  to	  the	  substantial	  reforms	  under	  way,	  of	  which	  a	  democratic	  constitution	  is	  both	  the	  basis	  and	  the	  essence.”42	  	  On	  July	  1,	  2011,	  the	  King’s	  promises	  resulted	  in	  a	  Constitutional	  referendum	  and	  a	  moderate	  political	  opening.	  	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  Western	  observers,	  Morocco	  quickly	  became	  a	  model	  for	  region-­‐wide	  democratic	  reform.	  	  Following	  a	  conversation	  with	  Morocco’s	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Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  in	  2012,	  former	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Hilary	  Clinton	  praised	  the	  reform	  process,	  stating	  that	  Morocco	  stands	  as	  an	  example,	  as	  a	  model	  of	  what	  can	  be	  achieved.	  	  	   Moroccans	  are	  strengthening	  their	  own	  democracy.	  	  Young	  people	  are	  having	  	   a	  say	  in	  their	  own	  future.	  	  His	  Majesty	  King	  Mohammed	  VI	  has	  begun	  the	  	   process	  of	  reform.	  	  We	  see	  women's	  rights	  protected	  and	  expanded,	  a	  more	  	   transparent	  and	  accountable	  government,	  establishing	  the	  Arab	  world's	  very	  	   first	  truth	  commission	  on	  human	  rights. 43	  	  	   Yet	  the	  Moroccan	  model	  does	  not	  stem	  from	  the	  promises	  made	  by	  Mohammad	  VI	  in	  his	  speech	  to	  the	  Moroccan	  people	  on	  March	  9,	  2011.	  	  Instead,	  the	  success	  of	  this	  speech	  and	  the	  minimal	  reforms	  that	  followed	  result	  from	  the	  liberal	  social	  and	  economic	  reform	  of	  the	  previous	  ten	  years.	  	  Mohammad	  VI	  entered	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  with	  a	  decent	  record	  of	  accomplishment	  on	  reform	  outside	  of	  politics.	  	  Human	  Development	  within	  the	  country	  improved,	  in	  the	  years	  since	  he	  came	  to	  power.	  	  For	  the	  most	  part	  women	  and	  minorities	  enjoyed	  better	  treatment.	  	  The	  press	  experienced	  periods	  of	  increased	  freedom.	  	  Morocco	  emerged	  from	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  in	  2007	  virtually	  unscathed.	  	  Though	  Mohammad	  VI’s	  record	  was	  not	  consistent,	  his	  record	  was	  not	  consistently	  poor,	  either.	  	  Thus,	  his	  strategy	  to	  modernize	  and	  liberalize	  while	  simultaneously	  increasing	  the	  regime’s	  durability	  through	  authoritarian	  practices	  paid	  off.	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